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Scope of Review for Orders
Confirming, Vacating, or Modifying
Arbitral Awards: An End to
Deferential Standards
First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan'

I. INTRODUCTION
Congressional intent to make arbitration a viable alternative to traditional
litigation is codified in the Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA"). Although the FAA
and the subsequent case law have settled most questions about the details of the
arbitration process, the United States Supreme Court in FirstOptions took up the
narrow issue of what standard of review should be used by an appellate court
reviewing a district court decision vacating, confirming or modifying an
arbitrator's order.' Facing the Court were two competing policies: the Court's
own policy of keeping standards of review simple and rational against the
Congressional policy of assuring that arbitration does not become a stopping point
on the way to court.4

II. FACTS AND HOLDING
First Options of Chicago, Inc., a firm that cleared trades on the Philadelphia
Stock Exchange, cleared the trading account of MK Investments, Inc. ("MKI"), an
investment firm wholly owned by Manuel Kaplan and his wife, Carol.3 In 1989,
the parties entered into a "workout" agreement to alleviate the debts owed to First
Options by MKI and the Kaplans.6 The debts were not paid and in 1989, First
Options demanded immediate payment of the entire MKI debt and further that the

1.

115 S. Ct. 1920 (1995).

2.

FEDERAL ARBMATION ACT, 9 U.S.C. § 1 et seq. (1988) [hereinafter FAA].
First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 115 S. Ct. 1920, 1923 (1995) [hereinafter First

3.

Options].
4. Id
5. Id. at 1922.

6.

Id.
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Kaplans be held personally responsible for any deficiency. 7 When the demands
went unsatisfied, First Options filed for arbitration by a panel of the Philadelphia
Stock Exchange.'
Although MKI accepted arbitration because one of the documents it signed
as part of the "workout" agreement included an arbitration clause, the Kaplans
claimed that they had not personally signed that document and thereafter filed
written objections with the arbitration panel claiming that the dispute was not
arbitrable.9 First Options argued that Mr. Kaplan was bound to arbitrate under
Exchange rules on several grounds: he was a member of the Exchange, was an
associated person of a member, or was MKI's alter ego. 10 The panel, finding
that they had the jurisdiction to rule on the merits of the dispute, ruled in favor
of First Options.'"
The Kaplans filed a petition in a Pennsylvania federal district court seeking
to vacate the arbitration award.' 2 The district court confirmed the award in a
memorandum opinion, basing its decision on the consent given in the "workout"
agreement document, despite the fact that the Kaplans had not personally signed
the document, or alternatively, on the Kaplans' counsel's participation in
arbitration discovery.' 3 The Kaplans and MKI appealed.' 4
The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the motion to vacate the
commercial arbitration award de novo,' 5 despite First Options argument that the
court should adopt the standard of the Eleventh Circuit and review decisions
denying petitions to vacate arbitration awards only for abuse of discretion. 6 The
court declined to apply this standard. 7 The court reversed the district court and
held that the Kaplans did not waive their jurisdictional objection, nor did they

7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Kaplan v. First Options of Chicago, Inc., 19 F.3d 1503, 1508 (3rd Cir. 1994) [hereinafter
Kaplan].
11. Id.
12. See FAA § 10 (1994).
13. Kaplan, 19 F.3d at 1508.
14. Id. at 1509.
15. Id. (citing Colonial Penn Ins. Co. v. Omaha Indem. Co., 943 F.2d 327, 331 (3d Cir. 1991));
Mutual Fire, Marine & Inland Ins. Co. v. Norad Reinsurance Co., 868 F.2d 52, 56 (3d Cir. 1989) ("In
reviewing the district court's denial of appellants [sic] motion to vacate the arbitration award, this
Court will stand in the shoes of the district court and determine whether appellants were entitled to
vacate the arbitration award pursuant to 9 U.S.C. § 10(d)."). See also R.M. Pereq & Assocs. v. Welch,
960 F.2d 534, 540 (5th Cir. 1992); Moseley, Hallgarten, Estabrook & Weeden v. Ellis, 849 F.2d 264,
267 (7th Cir. 1988).
16. Kaplan, 19 F.3d at 1508. See Robbins v. Day, 954 F.2d 679, 681-82 (11th Cir.), cerl.
denied, 113 S. Ct. 201 (1992).
17. Kaplan, 19 F.3d at 1509. The court noted that even if it had wanted to change the standard
of review, it was prohibited by Third Circuit Internal Operating Procedure 9.1 (1993) ("[N]o
subsequent panel overrules the holding in a published opinion of a previous panel."). Only the court
en banc could change the circuit's standard of review. Id.
18. Id. at 1512.
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consent to arbitrate their individual liability by signing the "workout" agreement
document.' 9
The United States Supreme Court upon granting certiorari, narrowed their

focus to two questions: (1) what standard of review should courts apply in
reviewing an arbitrator's decision on arbitrability when the objecting party
submitted the issue to the arbitrators for decision, and (2) whether the court of
appeals should have reviewed the district court's denial of the motion to vacate the
arbitration award "de novo."20 The United States Supreme Court, in affirming
the appellate court's decision, determined that courts should not assume that
parties have agreed to arbitrate arbitrability unless there is "clear and
unmistakable" evidence to the contrary."' In the present case, the Court found
no evidence that the Kaplans agreed to arbitrate arbitrability.22 The Court further
determined that the reviewing attitude of an appellate court should depend on the
institutional advantages of trial and appellate courts, and not on the standard of
review that will most likely produce a particular substantive result.23 Thus, the
Supreme Court held that the arbitrability issue is subject to independent review by
the courts and that the appellate courts should apply "ordinary" standards when
reviewing district court decisions upholding arbitration awards.24

HI. LEGAL BACKGROUND

2

The FAA establishes strict guidelines for district courts reviewing arbitration
awards.26 An award may be vacated, modified or corrected only upon grounds
set by the statute.2 7 However, the FAA does not provide what standard of review
an appellate court should use to review a district court decision concerning
arbitration awards.

19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.

Id.at1523.
First Options, 115 S. Ct. at 1922.
Id. at1924.
Id.at 1924-25.
Id. at 1926 (citing Salve Regina College v. Russell, 499 U.S. 225, 231-33 (1991)).
Id at 1924, 1926.

THE FIRST ISSUE WAS WHETHER AN
25. THE COURT DECIDED THREE ISSUES ON APPEAL
ARBITRATOR HAS THE PRIMARY POWER TO DECIDE WHETHER THE PARTIES AGREED TO ARBITRATE A
DISPUTE'S MERITS. THE COURT FOUND THAT THE ISSUE TURNS ON WHETHER THE PARTIES AGREED
TO SUBMIT THE ARBITRABIUrIY QUESTION TO AN ARBITRATOR.

THE COURT GROUNDED ITS DECISION

IN THE FACT THAT ARBITRATION IS SIMPLY A MATTER OF CONTRACT BETWEEN THE PARTIES. THE
SECOND ISSUE WAS WHETHER ON THE FACTS OF THE CASE, THE PARTIES SUBMITED ARBITRABILITY
TO THE ARBITRATOR, AND THE COURT FOUND THAT ONE OF THE PARTIES DID NOT.

THIS CASENOTE

FOCUSES ON THE THIRD ISSUE: THE STANDARD OF REVIEW THE COURTS OF APPEALS SHOULD APPLY
WHEN REVIEWING DISTRICT COURT DECISIONS UPHOLDING ARBITRATION AWARDS. PFRST OPTONM

115

S. CT. AT 1921-22.

26.

SeeFAA §§ 10-11 (1994).

27.

Id
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Courts have long noted that the FAA establishes a liberal federal policy
favoring arbitration agreements, so that when a court is in doubt as to the scope
of arbitrable issues, it should be resolved in favor of arbitration.28 In accord with
this policy, courts in general have established that a district court should review
an arbitrator's decision very narrowly.29 Although the circuits may use different
language to describe the standard, it is clear that the district and appellate courts
give great deference to an arbitrator's decisions.3"
While the standard of review for a district court reviewing an arbitrator's
decision has been thoroughly discussed, the standard of review employed by
appellate courts to subsequently review the district court's decision has been
and the approaches takenby the various circuits have lacked
discussed infrequently
3
uniformity. '
A. The Hybrid Standardof Review
In Bonar v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc.,32 the Eleventh Circuit Court of
Appeals stated that it was employing a "narrow abuse of discretion" standard to
review a district court's refusal to vacate an arbitration award.3 3 The court did
not discuss its reasons or cite any authority for the new found "abuse of
discretion" standard.3 4 The court nonetheless overturned the district court's
party's expert witness committed perjury
refusal to vacate because the prevailing
3
during the arbitration proceeding. 1
Without citing Bonar, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals later affirmed
the "abuse of discretion" standard in Raiford v. MerrilLynch, Pierce,Fenner &
Smith, Inc. 36 In a footnote, the court simply stated that "[a] district court's
disposition of a motion to vacate an arbitration award under the Arbitration Act
...
is reviewed only for abuse of discretion.3' Later in the opinion, the court
mentioned the national policy favoring arbitration and the need for expeditious
proceedings. 3' However, the court appeared to draw its standard for evaluating

28. Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983).
29. United Paperworkers Int'l Union v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 36 (1987). Errors in the
arbitrator's interpretation of law or findings of fact do not warrant reversal, nor does an insufficiency
of evidence supporting the decision. Id.
30. Osceola County Rural Water Sys. v. Subsurfco, Inc., 914 F.2d 1072, 1075 (8th Cir. 1990)
("narrow in scope"); Federated Dep't Stores Inc. v. J.V.B. Indus., 894 F.2d 862, 866 (6th Cir. 1990)
("extremely limited"); Maine Cent. R.R v. Brotherhood of Maintenance of Way Employees, 873 F.2d
425, 428 (1st Cir. 1989) ("among the narrowest in the law").
31. Bowles Fin. Group, Inc. v. Stifel Nicolaus & Co., 22 F.3d 1010, 1013 (10th Cir. 1994).
32. 835 F.2d 1378 (1lth Cir. 1988).
33. Bonar v. Dean Reynolds, Inc., 835 F.2d 1378, 1383 (11th Cir. 1988).
34. Id.
35. Id. at 1383-84.
36. 903 F.2d 1410, 1412 n.2 (11th Cir. 1990).
37. Raiford v. Merril Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 903 F.2d 1410, 1412 n.2 (11 th Cir.
1990).
38. Id. at 1413.
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the district court from the district court's standard of review of an arbitrator's
decision.39
The Eleventh Circuit clarified its reasoning and changed the standard two
years later in Robbins v. Day.40 The court of appeals, in altering its standard of

review, emphasized that "[tihe purpose of the Federal Arbitration Act was to
relieve congestion in the courts and to provide parties with an alternative method4

for dispute resolution that would be speedier and less costly than litigation."n '
Under this new standard, an appellate court reviewing a grant of a motion to
a
vacate an arbitration award reviews the decision de novo, while the denial of 42
similar motion would still be reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard.
The court reasoned that this standard emphasized the uniqueness of arbitration and
promoted the speed and finality of the process.43 The court was also influenced
by a law review article that appeared shortly after the Raiford decision." The
article noted the Eleventh Circuit's abuse of discretion standard in Raiford,45 and
suggested the hybrid standard of review on the grounds of section 15 of the FAA,
in which interlocutory appeals are allowed where the district court's order

disfavors arbitration, but not where the district court order favors arbitration.46

The Eleventh Circuit expanded on its reasoning in Schmidt v. Finberg,47

where the court of appeals was faced with reviewing a trial court's denial of a

motion to vacate an arbitration award.48 The court, citing Raiford, employed the
"abuse of discretion" standard. 49 The court noted that the basic policy behind

39. Id. at 1412-13.
40. 954 F.2d 679 (1lth Cir. 1992).
41. Robbins v. Day, 954 F.2d 679, 682 (1 1th Cir. 1992) (quoting Booth v. Hume Publishing,
Inc., 902 F.2d 925 (1 lthCir. 1990)).
42. Id. at 681.
43. Id at 682.
Selected Topics in Securities
44. Id.See also Stephen H. Kupperman & George C. Freeman Ill,
Arbitration: Rule 15c2-2, Fraud Duress, Unconscionability, Waiver, Class Arbitration, Punitive
Damages, Rights of Review, andAttorneys Fees and Costs, 65 TUL L REv. 1547 (1991).
45. Kupperman, supra note 44, at 1604.
46. Id. at 1605. The Kupperman article stated the reasoning for the standard as follows:
The standard most likely to reflect the strong federal policy favoring arbitration is a
hybrid standard--one that requires an appellate court to review confirmation of an award
for an abuse of discretion and to review vacation of an award de novo. Such a standard
would be even more deferential than the Fifth Circuit's standard since it would require
rigorous review of rulings vacating awards but only limited review of rulings confirming
awards. It would also mirror the structure of section 15 of the Arbitration Act. [footnote
omitted] Section 15 permits interlocutory appeals of orders favoring litigation over
arbitration but not vice-versa. More specifically, it'permits interlocutory appeals of orders
denying motions to compel arbitration and motions to stay litigation pending arbitration
but forbids interlocutory appeals of orders granting motions to compel and motions to
stay.
Id
47. 942 F.2d 1571 (1lth Cir. 1991).
48. Robbins, 954 F.2d at 681.
49. Id.
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arbitration was to relieve congestion in the courts and to give parties a speedy and
less costly alternative to litigation.50 Furthermore, the policy favoring arbitration

requires that the courts rigorously enforce agreements to arbitrate. 5' The court
thus reasoned that this policy is furthered by the hybrid standard of review, in
which the appellate court can assess whether a district court gave the proper
deference when it vacated the arbitration award. 2 Where the district court
denied the motion to vacate,53 the deference is presumed and an "abuse of

discretion" review is adequate.

B. De Novo Review
In contrast to the Eleventh Circuit, the Third, Fourth, Fifth, Ninth, and Tenth
Circuits have adopted a fairly uniform de novo standard of review of district court
decisions vacating or confirming an arbitration award.54 Although the Seventh
Circuit initially appeared to adopt this de novo standard, its precise standard has

recently been in doubt. 5

A particularly clear argument in favor of de novo review is found in
ForsytheInternational,S.A. v. Gibbs Oil Co. of Texas.56 Consistent with earlier
Fifth Circuit decisions,57 the court declined the appellee's request to affirm the
district court's vacatur of an arbitration award barring abuse of discretion by the
district court.5" The court adopted the de novo standard while emphasizing the

unique context of arbitration, which conditions judicial review by compelling

deference to the findings that precede the district court.59 The court found that
employing the abuse of discretion standard would risk forgetting the prior. and
critical deference due the findings of the arbitration panel and thus cripple

50. Id. at 682.
51. Id (quoting ShearsonlAm. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 226 (1987)).
52. Id
53. Id.
54. Kaplan, 19 F.3d at 1509; Peoples Sec. Life Ins. Co. v. Monumental Life Ins. Co., 991 F.2d
141, 145 (4th Cir. 1993); Atlantic Aviation, Inc. v. EBM Group, Inc., I1 F.3d 1276, 1282 (5th Cir.
1994); Employers Ins. of Wausau v. National Union Fire Ins. Co., 933 F.2d 1481, 1485 (9th Cir.
1991); Bowles Fin. Group, 22 F.3d at 1012.
55. Bowles Fin. Group, 22 F.3d at 1012.
56. 915 F.2d 1017, 1020-21 (5th Cir. 1990).
57. Delta Queen Steamboat Co. v. District 2 Marine Eng'rs Beneficial Ass'n, 889 F.2d 599, 602
(5th Cir. 1989), cert denied, 111 S. CL 148 (1990) (expressly reviewing de novo whether award
grounded in collecting bargaining agreement); Folger Coffee Co. v. International Union, Local 1805,
905 F.2d 108, 110-12 (5th Cir. 1990) (implicitly reviewing de novo whether award drew essence from
collective bargaining agreement); Antwine v. Prudential Bache Sec. Inc., 899 F.2d 410, 413 (5th Cir.
1990) (implicitly reviewing de novo district court's refusal to vacate award based on panel's alleged
noncompliance with securities arbitration rules); Container Prod., Inc. v. United Steelworkers of Am.,
873 F.2d 818, 819 (5th Cir. 1989) (implicitly reviewing de novo whether arbitrator exceeded his
authority).
58. Forsythe, 915 F.2d at 1021.
59. Id.

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/jdr/vol1996/iss1/12

6

Munsell: Munsell: Scope of Review for Orders Confirming, Vacating, or Modifying Arbitral Awards:
An End To DeferentialStandards
19961
appellate review of whether the district court accorded sufficient deference in the
first judicial review.'
The Fifth Circuit decision in Anderman/Smith Operating Co. v. Tennessee
Gas Pipeline Co.6 is a further example of the de novo standard. In Anderman,
the Fifth Circuit affirmed the de novo standard where the district court granted a
motion to confirm an arbitration award.62 Again, the appellate court noted that
the Congressional policy of promoting arbitration mandates that district courts
leave an arbitrator's decision alone wherever possible, but this deference does not
require that appellate courts give that same deference to the district court.63
While judicial deference in general is necessary, using an abuse of discretion
standard toward the district court would in effect add an extra layer of unnecessary
deference to the decision."
As previously indicated, the Seventh Circuit has not been as clear about its
review of district courts in these circumstances.65 While the Seventh Circuit
explicitly stated in Moseley, Hallgarten,Estabrook & Weeden, Inc. v. Ellis that
it was in the same position as the district court, and thus would determine on its
own whether the appellant was entitled to vacation or modification of the
arbitration award,67 its standard has been unclear in a more recent decision."
In Ejer Manufacturing,Inc. v. Kowin Development Corp., the Seventh Circuit
emphasized the deference owed the arbitrator,70 yet failed to mention explicitly
that it owed no deference to the district court. 7' More importantly, the Tenth
Circuit in Bowles FinancialGroup, Inc. v. Stifel Nicolaus & Co., in determining
its own standard of review to be de novo, interpreted the Eljer Manufacturing
decision to mean that the Seventh Circuit employs a deferential standard similar
to the Eleventh Circuit. 2
Although the balance of the circuits have not expressly stated their standard
of review, they implicitly use the same standard employed in the ordinary review

60. Id.
61. 918 F.2d 1215 (5th Cir. 1990).
62. Anderman/Smith Operating Co. v. Tennessee Gas Pipeline Co., 918 F.2d 1215, 1218 (5th Cir.
1990).
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Supra note 55.

66. 849 F.2d 264 (7th Cir. 1988).
67. Mosley, Hallgarten, Estabrook &Weeden, Inc. v. Ellis, 849 F.2d 264, 267 (7th Cir. 1988).
The court also noted the Eleventh Circuits "abuse of discretion" standard in the Bonar decision. Id. at
264.
68. See Eljer Mfg., Inc. v. Kowin Dev. Corp., 849 F.2d 264 (7th Cir. 1988).
69. 14 F.3d 1250 (7th Cir. 1993).

70. Eyjer Mfg., Inc., 14 F.3d at 1254. "Arestrictive standard of review is necessary to preserve
these benefits and to prevent arbitration from becoming a 'preliminary step to judicial resolution.'" Id
(quoting E.I. DuPont de Nemours v. Grasselli Employees Indep. Ass'n, 790 F.2d 611, 614 (7th Cir.
1986)).
71. Id
72. Bowles Fin Group, 22 F.3d at 1012.
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73
of district court decisions that do not pertain to arbitration. For example, the
74
Second Circuit in Lyeth v. Chrysler Corp., simply stated, without any
elaboration, the standard of review employed by any court, trial or appellate, in
75
reviewing a compulsory arbitration award under the New York Lemon Law.
The court therein did not discuss its reviewing stance towards the district court
decision confirming the award, although it implicitly reviewed the arbitrator's
decision directly on the evidence in record.76

IV. INSTANT DECISION
In the instant case, the Court first clarified the terms for the standard of
review. 77 Although the Third Circuit, in prior decisions, used the words "de
novo" to describe the standard, the United States Supreme Court sunmarily stated
that all circuits except for the Eleventh Circuit believe that the standard of review
of district court decisions should be uniform even in the context of arbitration
review. 78 Thus, the proper standard in cases involving arbitration is that where
a district court has found an agreement between parties, the appellate court is to
accept findings of fact that are not "clearly erroneous" while deciding questions
of law de novo."
The Court then briefly acknowledged the standard of review which the
petitioner, First Options, requested, that of the lone dissenting Court of Appeals,
the Eleventh Circuit.'0 The Court stated that the Eleventh Circuit relied on
"federal policy favoring arbitration" to apply the hybrid approach, citing Robbins
as an example of this approach.8 '
The Court proceeded to give its rationale for agreeing with the majority
"ordinary" standard. 2 First, the Court held that it was undesirable to complicate
8
the law with numerous review standards that lacked logical precedent. 3 Second,
and more importantly, the standard of review employed by an appellate court
reviewing a district court decision should depend upon the "respective institutional

73. See, e.g., Lyeth v. Chrysler Corp., 929 F.2d 891, 896 (2nd Cir. 1990).
74. 929 F.2d 891 (2nd Cir. 1991).
75. Lyeth, 929 F.2d at 896. "The applicable standard of review for a compulsory arbitration
award under the Lemon Law is whether the award is supported by adequate evidence in the record and
whether it is 'rational and satistlies] the arbitrary and capricious standards of CPLR article 78." Id
(quoting Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. New York, 550 N.E.2d 919, 925 (N.Y. 1990)).
76. Id.
77. First Options, 115 S.CL at 1920. Recall that the Court decided three issues on appeal, but
this note focuses only on the issue regarding appellate standards of review.
78. Id at 1926.
79. Id.
80. Id
81. Id
82. Id
83. Id
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advantages" of trial and appellate courts." Therefore, according to the Court, the
appellate court should not employ a standard of review that it believes will be

more likely to produce a particular substantive result.8 5 The Court illustrated the
"institutional advantages" concept with the example of judicial review of

administrative agencies. 6 The law requires that all courts (trial and appellate),
give those administrative agencies a degree of "legal leeway" when reviewing
certain interpretations of the law.Y But this "leeway" does not extend, in any
jurisdiction, to appellate review of district court decisions upholding an agency
Thus, although the judiciary gives "leeway," each part of the
decision.
judiciary, trial and appellate court, gives the administrative decision the same
scrutiny. Accordingly, although district courts may give "leeway" to arbitrator's
decisions upon initial review, this fact does not warrant an appellate court giving
a district court "leeway" simply because the district court made the favored
decision of upholding an arbitrator.89
Finally, the Court dispensed with First Options' argument that the hybrid
review was justified by the uniqueness of the FAA.' First Options argued that
because the FAA allowed appellate courts to conduct interlocutory review of some
anti-arbitration district court rulings, while forbidding interlocutory review of
9
orders upholding arbitration, the hybrid standard of review was justified. ' The
Court rejected this argument on the grounds that because the cited rule governed
the timing of review, it was too weak to support the claim that the appellate court
should use a different standard when reviewing this type of district court
decision.9 Moreover, according to the Court, the FAA says nothing specifically
about standards of review.93 Thus, the Court concluded that the Third Circuit
Court of Appeals was correct when it used the traditional standard of review for
reviewing the district court's arbitrability decision. 94

84.
85.
86.

87.
88.
89.
90.
91.

Id. (quoting Salve Regina College, 499 U.S. at 231-33).
Id.
Id
Id.
Id
Id
Id.
Id (citing FAA § 16). This is the section cited earlier by Kuppenman, supra note 46, which

allows interlocutory appeals of orders denying motions to compel arbitration and motions to stay
litigation pending arbitration but forbids interlocutory appeals of orders granting motions to compel
and motions to stay.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1996

9

Journal of Dispute Resolution, Vol. 1996, Iss. 1 [1996], Art. 12
[Vol. 1996, No. I
JOURNAL OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION
V.

COMMENT

The instant decision is consistent with the Court's stated policy of basing
standards of review on the institutional advantages of trial and appellate courts.95
However, the. competing policy of ensuring that arbitration does not become a
preliminary step in litigation must be considered as well. The Court gives short
shrift to the latter policy and dismisses with little discussion the Eleventh Circuit's
rationale for the hybrid standard of review. Furthermore, the Court fails to discuss
the inconsistent standard of review among the circuits, especially for mixed
questions of fact and law.
The policy favoring arbitration is well established, and is embodied in, among
other statutes, FAA section 16.96 Congress therein codified judicial deference to
the arbitration process, a preference reflected by the fact that the statute provides
for interlocutory appeal only when the district court order disfavors arbitration.'
This extreme favoritism towards the arbitration process reflects congressional
confidence in the arbitration process to make the right decision in the large
majority of cases and to reduce the caseload in federal courts. Allowing
interlocutory appeals only where the district court denies arbitration puts judges
on notice that if they deny an arbitration motion, they had better have a sound
reason because the decision will likely be reviewed immediately. In contrast, after
the matter is arbitrated, there is less possibility of successful appeal on the order
to arbitrate. Thus, district courts err on the side of granting motions to compel
arbitration.
The First Options court found that section 16 did not adequately support the
premise of a hybrid standard of review because section 16 governs the timing of
review." The Court attempted to compartmentalize the issues, implying that a
hybrid standard of review cannot logically relate to the congressional intent
regarding timing of review. However, the basis of the hybrid standard should not
have to come from a statute, but can be supported by the congressional intent to
favor arbitration. The hybrid standard of review is simply a reflection of
congressional intent that litigants should not be allowed two separate stages of
rigorous review, first by a district court, and again by an appellate court.
Allowing an appellate court to take a fresh look at the arbitration proceedings
gives the losing party a ray of hope. Even though the party has twice lost, an
appellate court, owing no deference to the district court, will take a rigorous look
at the arbitrator's decision. This extra step is in opposition to Congress' intent
that the arbitration process be an efficient forum to resolve differences with little
court involvement. The hybrid standard does favor an outcome, but no more so
than other standards appellate courts employ.

95.
96.
97.
98.

Id
FAA § 16.
See supra note 46.
First Options, 115 S. Ct. at 1926.
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For example, many appellate courts employ a type of "hybrid" standard of
review to district court decisions regarding new trial motions in the context ofjury
trials. 99 Those appellate courts state that their abuse of discretion standard of
review is less rigorous for a denial of a motion for a new trial than for a grant of
the same motion.'00 "Hybrid" standards are also used to review denials of leave
Obviously, these standards
to amend pleadings more strictly than grants.
reflect policy concerns regarding overriding juries and easy amendment of
pleadings.1 0 2 The appellate courts grant more deference where the district court
arrived at the favored outcome because, for instance, the jury verdict is presumed
to be correct. Likewise, the hybrid standard of review used by the Eleventh
The
Circuit reflects the federal policy favoring arbitration of disputes.
presumption is that arbitration awards are enforceable.'0 3 The appellate courts
should grant more deferenceto a district court that confirms an award becausethat
decision is presumed to be correct.
Beyond the policy arguments, it is also troublesome that the First Options
opinion failed to discuss the division among the circuits on the proper standard,
especiallythe division over mixed questions of law and fact in motions to confirm,
modify or vacate an award. Although the Court states that all but the Eleventh
Circuit were using an "ordinary" standard of review,' 4 it is not clear that this
is true. As previously noted, the Seventh Circuit was a moving target on this
issue.'
The Seventh Circuit stated they were using a de novo standard, then
seemed to use a deferential standard in a more recent case.'o Moreover, the
circuits were unclear as to which standard to use when there is a mixed question
of law and fact, which is a difficult issue in this context."0 The Fifth Circuit,
in reviewing a district court order confirming an award, held that the de novo
standard should be used where the order is a mixed question of law and fact.'0 8
The Fourth Circuit, reviewing the same type of order, reviewed the order partly

99.

Reply Brief at 17, First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 115 S. Ct. 1920 (1995) (No. 94-

560).
100. Id. (citing 1 S. CH[LDREss & M. DAVIS, FEDERAL STANDARDS OF REvIEw 5-82 (2d ed.
1992))
101. Id. See, e.g., Mayes v. Leipziger, 729 F.2d 605, 608 (9th Cir. 1984).
102. Id.
103. Kupperman, supra note 44, at 1603.
104. The Court stated the "ordinary" standard of review: "accept[] fimdings of fact that are not
'clearly erroneous' but [decide] questions of law de novo." First Options, 115 S. Ct. at 1926.
105. See discussion supra notes 66-72.
106. Id.
107. 4 LIAN
R MAcNInLEr TAL, FEDERAL ARBrRATION LAW § 43.6 (1994). The authors submit
that most lower court decisions regarding the grounds for challenging arbitral awards will be mixed
questions of law or fact They advocate the hybrid standard of Robbins be used on these mixed
questions, so that the integrity of the process is protected where a district court rebuts the presumption
that an arbitration award is enforceable.
108. Mcllroy v. PaineWebber, Inc., 989 F.2d 817, 819-820 (5th Cit. 1990), relying on Forsyth
Int'l, S.A. v. Gibbs Oil Co., 915 F.2d 1017, 1020 (5th Cir. 1990). MACNEIL, supranote 107, at 43:13
n.16e (1994).
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de novo and partly under the clearly erroneous standard."° As the United States
Supreme Court noted in the First Options opinion, the Third Circuit sometimes
used the word "de novo" to describe its standard. The Court dismissed this
ambiguity as unimportant, but the imprecision in terms indicates that the Third
Circuit was unsure of what standard to employ. Nonetheless, the Court found that
0
all circuits believed that only the "ordinary" standard of review applied."
Additionally, the Court failed to consider the effects of the deferential
standard in the Eleventh Circuit. The Court did not discuss whether the standard
was causing incorrect arbitration awards to slip through the system. A cursory
inspection of the several decisions that have applied the hybrid standard of review
would have found that at least one decision, Bonar, reversed the district court's
order to confirm even under the appellate court's deferential standard of
review. 1 ' The hybrid standard of review is not going to deprive deserving
parties of a just result. In the rare instance where both the arbitrator and the
district court are incorrect, even an abuse of discretion standard can correct the
error.1 2 But under the standard set forth by the Court, the higher court is forced
to take a fresh look at the arbitration record, a redundant procedure that
undermines the efficiency of the arbitration process.

VI. CONCLUSION
The First Options decision makes clear that the United States Supreme
Court's main factor in determining standards of review is based on uniformity, not
the peculiar needs of the arbitration process. Despite clear Congressional intent
to make the arbitration process efficient and allow little court involvement, the
Court refused to diverge from its policy to keep standards of review simple. Since
Congress, however, has prescribed the narrow grounds for a court to overturn an
arbitrator, in the future Congress may also prescribe the standard of review an
appellate court uses to review a district court that confirms, modifies or vacates
an arbitration award.
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